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This paper reports on the development and evaluation of a prototype blockchain 
solution for private and secure individual “omics” health data management and sharing. 
This solution is one output of a multidisciplinary project investigating the social, data 
and technical issues surrounding application of blockchain technology in the context of 
personalized healthcare research.  The project studies potential ethical, legal, social 
and cognitive constraints of self-sovereign healthcare data management and sharing, 
and whether such constraints can be addressed through careful user interface design 
of a blockchain solution.    
 
Introduction 
There is a news story almost every day about how individuals’ personal data are being harvested, shared 
with and used by third parties without their consent and in ways that have real potential to cause harm. 
The result is an erosion of user trust and a reluctance to use services that gather sensitive information 
(Edelman, 2019). This remains true for a significant percentage of individuals even if they could greatly 
benefit from receiving a personalized health service that they can use to understand their health risks and 
maintain or improve their overall health (Betts and Korenda, 2018; Shabani, Bezuidenhout, and Borry, 
2014). Individuals’ reluctance may stem from uncertainty about how health data services will store and 
use their data over time (Sanderson et al. 2016; Shabani, Bezuidenhout and Borry, 2014). Recent 
revelations about how Facebook, 23&Me, and other platforms use individuals’ sensitive personal data 
validates concerns that consumers’ data may be shared with third parties without their informed consent 
(see, e.g., Rosenberg, 2018; Geggel, 2018).  
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This paper reports on an ongoing multidisciplinary research project that responds to concerns about 
health data privacy and sharing, in particular, through investigation of the potential application of 
blockchain technology. Blockchains are distributed ledgers in which confirmed and validated blocks are 
organized in an append-only chain using cryptographic links in support of the goal of decentralized, 
autonomous trust (InterPARES 2017). Some argue that blockchain technology can be used to provide 
individuals with control over their own data (i.e., “self-sovereignty” [Allen, 2016]) to prevent the kind 
of “databuse” (Wittes, 2011) that has reduced individuals’ trust in sharing their data. On the other hand, 
blockchain technology is an emerging technology that, thus far, has proven difficult for all but experts to 
grasp. Research has shown that blockchain has a usability problem (Kromholz, et al., 2016; Eskandari et 
al., 2018). Given this reality, it is fair to ask if data self-sovereignty enabled by blockchain technology is 
really the solution to protecting individual’s health data.  While there have been many studies of using 
blockchain technology in healthcare (Zyskind, Nathan and Pentland, 2015a & b; Peterson et al, 2016; 
Mackay and Nayyar, 2017; Xia et al., 2017; Dubovitskaya et al., 2017; Ferdous et al., 2017; Brogan, 
Baskaran and Ramachandran, 2018; Griggs et al., 2108; Kaur et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Zhou, 
Wang and Sun, 2018), we actually know very little about how individuals might actually respond to 
controlling their own data using blockchain technology. Thus, to shed greater light on the use of 
blockchain technology to enable data self-sovereignty from the end user’s perspective, we developed a 
technical artefact – the self-sovereign health data management blockchain solution design. We then used 
the artefact to stimulate a conversation with focus group participants to learn more about how 
individuals would respond to being given control over their own health data and using a blockchain 
solution to manage and share their data.  
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Background Literature 
Advancing personalized medicine: Why both data sharing and data privacy matter 
Omics science, including genomics, proteomics, exposomics, phenomics, microbiomics and 
metabolomics (Horgan and Kenny, 2011), provides insights into health at a molecular level never before 
possible and has the potential to radically alter healthcare. Omic science establishes a sophisticated, 
systemic understanding of the “complex, longitudinal, and dynamic nature of biological networks (and 
their fluctuations in response to social/environment exposures) that fundamentally govern human health 
and disease” (Holmes et al., 2010, 327). Indeed, Bencharit (2012) asserts that “the new era of omics 
studies . . . may lead to a true clinical application of personalized medicine.”  
 
The undeniable social good that omics could do is not without challenges and risks, however. Privacy 
for participants in research and in clinical applications is a major concern because “[b]y nature, the 
genome encodes a sensitive yet heritable signature of an individual that is marked by genetic variation 
reflecting one’s ancestry and disclosing one’s susceptibility to health and diseases” (Shi and Wu, 2017, 
61). Both Canada and the United States have passed genetic non-discrimination acts (e.g., Genetic Non-
Discrimination Act, S.C.2017, c.3; Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, 29 USC §216(e), 29 
USC §1132) in light of the potential medical, professional, legal and social consequences that 
individuals might face should their genomic information be disclosed. Other omic information also has 
the same potential for abuse. Given the very grave potential consequences of unauthorized disclosure of 
omic data, protecting the privacy of individuals is of paramount importance. 
   
Family privacy is also a concern, since omics science extends not just to the individual, but to their 
family as well (Shi and Wu, 2017, 61). After all, genes are heritable – breaching the genetics of one 
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individual may easily reveal private information about those who share that individual’s genes. “Clinical 
genetics guidelines [in the United Kingdom] conceptualise genetic information as confidential to 
families, not individuals” (Dheensa, Fenwick and Lucassen, 2017, 1).  
 
Beyond consideration of the consequences of privacy breaches, however, lies a deeper reason to ensure 
that individuals’ privacy is protected. In a world in which we increasingly live online, we are our data 
and are data are us (Cheney-Lippold, 2018). The philosopher and information ethicist, Luciano Floridi 
views consequentialist ethical frames of reference that focus on judging actions as moral or not based on 
their outcomes as insufficient (Floridi, 1999).  He writes that, “Typically, privacy and confidentiality are 
treated as problems concerning S’ ownership of some information, the information being somehow 
embarrassing, shameful, ominous, threatening, unpopular or harmful for S’ life and well-being, yet this 
is very misleading, for the nature of the information in question is quite irrelevant. It is when the 
information is as innocuous as one may wish it to be that the question of privacy acquires its clearest 
value. The husband, who reads the diary of his wife without her permission and finds in it only 
memories of their love, has still acted wrongly. The source of the wrongness is not the consequences, 
nor any general maxim concerning personal privacy, but a lack of care and respect for the individual, 
who is also her information.” (Floridi, 1999, p. 53).  Thus, we see in Floridi an approach that views an 
individuals’ data as equivalent to the individual themselves, which suggests that to abuse a person’s data 
is tantamount to an assault of their physical being.  
 
Simply locking data away, then, is a poor solution. “Sharing genetic findings is vital for accelerating the 
pace of biomedical discoveries and for fully realizing the promises of the genetic revolution” (Erlich and 
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Narayanan, 2014, 409). Thus, if omic research is to be utilized to its full potential, solutions must be 
found to protect privacy while still permitting data sharing and usage. 
 
Blockchain Technology: A possible solution to private & secure data sharing 
Blockchain’s design and networked, distributed, autonomous, and global operation establish it as a 
disruptive technology with social, political, and economic implications that far exceed those of other 
emerging technologies with many potential applications (Economist, 2015; Casey & Vigna, 2018). One 
of the key applications identified has been in connection with decentralized management of data and 
privacy.  
 
Swan (2015) notes that, by managing electronic medical records in the blockchain, they “could be 
analyzed but remain private, with an embedded economic layer to compensate data contribution and 
use.” She also envisions “a standardized secure mechanism for digitizing health data into a health data 
commons” where patients could consent to making their health data available for research use in 
exchange for cryptocurrency. Benchoufi and Ravaud advocate for blockchain to address 
“reproducibility, data sharing, personal data privacy concerns and patient enrolment” (2017, 335), and 
emphasize “the transparency of the Blockchain ledger – owned by no one, publicly writable by anyone 
[…] users do not need any third party to trust the system” (2017, 338). And, Gropper (2016) proposes 
the application of a decentralized identity management solution within the healthcare sector.  
 
 With the level of trust that it can enforce, blockchain also could be considered a path through the 
complexities of user consent. Meaningful consent is critical if health data is to be used both ethically and 
legally with “[C]onsent [being] a cornerstone of both biomedical research ethics and data protection 
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law” (Thorogood and Zawati, 2015, 693). A number of studies have aimed to apply blockchain 
technology to giving individuals direct control over access to their medical records and consenting to 
secondary use of their health data for research purposes. Ekblaw et al (2016), Ivan (2016), Broderson et 
al (2016), Li et al (2017), Linn and Koo (2016), and Dagher et al (2018) discuss blockchain-based 
medical records systems that incorporate user-defined permissioning while still storing patient records in 
a provider’s existing systems. Yue et al (2017) propose the Healthcare Data Gateway application to 
allow users to control their own health data and permission its use for research purposes. Zhang et al 
(2018) present a decentralized application for patient-defined access to structured pieces of their health 
data record and Patel (2018) discusses a blockchain-based framework for medical image sharing that 
allows for patient-defined access permissions. Finally, Hofman et al (2018) discuss a blockchain 
prototype for managing user consent in the use of clinical data for precision health research.  
 
While blockchain could be a solution to some of the challenges of securing and protecting patients’ 
health data (Engelhardt, 2017), giving patients greater control over their data using this technology, it is 
not without its challenges (Gordon and Catalini, 2018). The cryptography and networking involved in 
blockchain technology can make it difficult for even IT specialists to understand, let alone users 
(Lunggren, 2019).  Many patients already have difficulty navigating the healthcare system, which raises 
questions about whether placing the added burden upon them of managing their own healthcare records, 
and associated consents to access and use of the data within these records, will truly generate a net 
positive effect (Gordon and Catalini, 2018). Omic data is particularly challenging in terms of 
meaningful, informed consent. Indeed, omic data represents an extreme form of “the transparency 
paradox […] If notice (in the form of a privacy policy) finely details every flow, condition, qualification, 
and exception, we know that it is unlikely to be understood, let alone read. […] An abbreviated, plain-
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language policy would be quick and easy to read, but it is the hidden details that carry the significance” 
(Nissenbaum, 2010, 36). After all, omic research techniques – and therefore research purposes – 
advance quickly, making it challenging to explain the purpose, risks, and benefits of studies in an 
accessible way. Indeed, it is difficult to even predict “all the informational benefits and risks of research 
with complex genomic information” (Thorogood and Zawati, 2015, 694). Moreover, some bioethicists 
also worry about the possibility of coercion if patients are financially incentivized to share their personal 
health data (Gammon, 2018). A blockchain solution can give users greater control over access to their 
health records and consent to use of their health data, but will they be able to navigate both the 
complexity of consent in addition to a novel technology?  Searching for answers matters. 
 
Methodology 
We followed a multi-method, two-stage methodology to find out more about the potential of blockchain 
technology to be used to protect the privacy of individuals’ personal health data and enable secure data 
sharing without introducing cognitive and other barriers that might prevent users from understanding 
and effectively navigating the such systems. 
 
Stage One: Designing a Self-Sovereign Health Data Management Solution 
In the first stage, we set out to design a technical artefact, in the form of a blockchain solution that 
fundamentally respects users’ right to privacy and provides them with the same level of choice and 
control over the sharing of their data as they would expect over the sharing of their bodies, with a view 
to exploring our research question. We decided that blockchain protocols that came closest to our vision 
were those that supported self-sovereign identity . Self-sovereign identity (SSI), a variant of 
decentralized digital identity, leverages the affordances of blockchain technology to increase users’ 
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control of their identities in the digital world (Allen, 2016). It implies that individuals’ identities and the 
data associated with them are neither bestowed, revocable nor owned by any authority save for the 
individual herself. Christopher Allen writes that “[s]elf-sovereign identity is the next step beyond user-
centric identity […] the user must be central to the administration of identity [with] true user control of 
that digital identity, creating user autonomy: (Allen, 2016) Kaliya Young and Heather Vescent (2018) 
explain that “Self Sovereign Identity is a new technology layer that enables individuals and 
organizations to assert their own identity.” Tobin and Reed (2017) describe Self-Sovereign Identity as 
“the result of trying to satisfy three basic requirements: 1. Security - the identity information must be 
protected from unintentional disclosure; 2. Control - the identity owner must be in control of who can 
see and access their data and for what purposes (see Figure 1); and 3. Portability - the user must be able 
to use their identity data wherever they want and not be tied into a single provider. Tim Bouma (2019) 
argues that in “the old (centralized and federated) models the locus of control was between the other 
parties that could make decisions about me, whether I was in the picture or not.” The basic tenets of SSI 
can be summarized at a high-level as follows: 1) every individual human being is the original source of 
their own identity; 2) identity is not an administrative mechanism for others to control; and 3) each 
individual is the root of their own identity and central to its administration (IBM, 2018). This approach 
differs markedly from Privacy by Design (Cavoukian, 2011) and Global Alliance for Genetic Health 
(GA4GH)’s Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data (GA4GH, 2016), 
wherein data stewards, research ethics boards, and researchers still make decisions about a data subject’s 
data. By contrast, with self-sovereign identity the locus of ownership and control of decision-making 
shifts to the individual.  
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Figure 1: Self-Sovereign Identity Locus of Control (Bouma, 2019). 
 
Having decided upon an SSI-based solution design, we created a design artefact using prototyping and 
agile software development. The agile approach draws upon a group-based, collaborative software 
development methodology that uses iterative, highly context sensitive requirements for identification, 
design, implementation, and evaluation. Agile development typically involves short, intense sprints 
wherein cross-functional teams gather in “scrums” to identify requirements, develop code, and evaluate 
the functionality of a proof-of-concept software application (Agile Alliance, 2013).  
 
Given the focus of the solution design on shifting the locus of control, custody and decision-making 
about health data to users of the solution, we also employed user-centered design (UCD) as the general 
methodological approach to the design and implementation of our prototype. UCD methodology is also 
widely used when designing health care services (LeRouge & Wickramasinghe, 2013; Xie & Carayon, 
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2015) UCD ensures the involvement of users and the inclusion of their perspectives in the research, 
development and assessment phases of a design (Ghulam Sarwar Shah and Robinson, 2006).  
 
The architecture of resulting technical artefact, which was developed on Hyperledger Indy (HLI), is 
shown in Figure 2.  HLI is comprised of four basic components: 1) verifiable claims, 2) peer-to-peer 
agents, 3) decentralized identifiers, and 4) a distributed ledger. Verifiable claims are a “machine-
readable statement made by an entity that is cryptographically authentic (non-repudiable)” (W3C, 2019). 
Verifiable claims are made when a “holder” agent sends a cryptographic credential – provable digitally 
signed data - received from an “issuer” agent to another “verifier” agent across a peer-to-peer 
connection which the receiving verifier agent is able to cryptographically prove is authentic (see Figure 
4). Each interacting agent has a decentralized identifier - a new type of identifier for verifiable, “self-
sovereign” digital identity that is independent from any centralized registry, identity provider, or 
certificate authority (W3C, 2019; DIF, 2019) - used to facilitate communication in each pairwise 
connection. HL Indy employs privacy-enhancing techniques, such as selective disclosure and zero-
knowledge proofs – a cryptographic technique allowing an agent to prove that they know something, 
such as a password, without revealing what they know. A distributed ledger – a ledger that is shared 
across a set of nodes (i.e., network endpoints) and synchronized between the nodes using a consensus 
mechanism (e.g., Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) – is used to store Public DIDs (e.g., of issuer 
agents), data schemas for credentials, credential definitions, and revocation registries – that enable the 
cryptographic verification of claims. 
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Figure 4: High Level Solution Architecture (Source: Anon Solutions). 
 
Our specific solution design incorporated four main actors: 1) MYco, which is an issuer of individuals’ 
health credentials; 2) Ethics Review Boards (ERB), which issue ethics credentials to researchers so that 
individuals can verify that their data will be handled properly when shared; 3) Researchers, who apply to 
the ERB to conduct research projects and market these to data owners; and 4) Data Owners, MYco 
clients who hold health credentials issued by MYco that are shared with researchers with the data 
owner’s consent. The solution was designed to support a number of steps in the process of providing 
individuals with control of their health data and enabling privacy-preserving and secure data sharing in 
support of personalized health research.  
 
The first step in the process of data owners sharing their data and receiving rewards for their 
contributions occurs when they request cryptographic credentials for each of their biomarkers from 
MYCo.  MYco then issues these credentials to the personal health wallet (agent) of each individual data 
owner (MYco client).   
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 The solution also supports researchers’ application to an Ethics Review Board (ERB) for ethics 
certificates to conduct their research, and once approved, the sending of the ethics certificate in the form 
of a cryptographic credential to the wallet (agent) of the applicant/researcher. Once they have ethics 
approval, researchers are then able to use the solution to advertise their research projects to data owners.  
  
When a data owner notices a research project in which s/he would like to participate, this initiates a 
“handshake” process using a peer-to-peer connection in which data owners verify that the research 
project has the necessary ethics approval and researchers verify that data owners meet their study criteria 
and consent to the sharing of their data.  The process completes when data owners share the specific 
health data (e.g., biomarkers) needed for the study and researchers send data owners a reward for their 
participation in the study in the form of a cryptographic credential. Figure 3 represents a visual overview 
of the “handshake” process that takes place between data owners and researchers.  A key feature of the 
entire handshake process is its alignment with the motivating theoretical and design principles; that is, 
the solution is designed to ensure that the identity of data owners is never revealed to researchers, no 
personal health information is ever recorded or stored on the blockchain to prevent conflicts with 
privacy laws and reduce the potential for privacy breaches, and data owners remain in control of their 
personal health information at all times, revealing only as much information as they feel comfortable 
with given their assessment of the risk-benefits of the transaction. 
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Figure 3: Wireframe showing Handshake Process. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage Two: Focus Group Evaluation of Blockchain Solution Design 
Qualitative data analysis 
As described in the previous section, validation of the solution design was done throughout the process 
of designing and implementing a prototype, with final evaluation of the prototype relying upon data 
gathered from three focus groups. Focus groups are suitable for exploring the attitudes towards new 
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phenomena such as blockchain, as the relatively open-ended discussions can sensitize researchers to 
unrealized issues and increase the comprehensiveness of large-scale surveys conducted afterward 
(Morgan, 2005). .  In total, 26 individuals participated in our study, with eight in the first focus group, 
eight in the second group and ten in the third group.. The focus groups were comprised of individuals 
aged 25-60 years old recruited from an online graduate student group. Among all the participants, three 
participants recently finished their advanced degrees (Master/PhD), and the rest are all enrolled in a 
Master or PhD program. Five participants have an education background in information management or 
archival science, and eight participants are enrolled in graduate programs in the medical field. All the 
participants have been  patients at some point in life. 
 
During the focus group, participants were primed with a presentation that contained information about 
the following topics: consent, management, privacy of personal health data and blockchain technology.  
Then they were shown wireframes of the user interface of the prototype solution and asked a set of semi-
structured questions relating to their understanding of blockchain technology, the views of data privacy 
and sharing, and their thoughts on the user interface. The focus groups were audio recorded with 
participant consent. The audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and then the recordings were 
destroyed. Transcriptions were pseudonymized and coded for analysis using NVIVO qualitative analysis 
software. The research team read the participants’ responses and extracted 6 main codes as shown in 
table 1.  
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Table 1: Analytic codes extracted from focus group participant statements. 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
Compensation and rewards Types of rewards related to data sharing and the impacts of 
having them. 
Ethics Ethical issues and concerns in relation to health data sharing, 
use and control. 
Health data Discussions about health data.  
Access Questions and answers related to centralized and decentralized 
access, equity, difficulties. 
Control Discussion about the relevance of personal data control, data 
expiration, and ownership. 
Sharing Health data sharing with or without consent, who to share with 
and benefits and risks of sharing (not including ethical issues 
and concerns). 
Privacy Discussion about privacy issues, ownership and 
anonymization. 
Systems design The usability and design of the platform; suggestions for 
improvement. 
Trustworthiness, security 
and comfort 
Discussion about the trustworthiness, security and level of 
comfort with using decentralized system. 
 
Findings 
Participants’ responses flag a number of unresolved challenges to the adoption of blockchains as 
solutions for private and secure data sharing in healthcare, as well as specific areas for improvement of 
our specific solution design. The following sections provide a high-level summary of participants’ 
feedback. 
 
Focus group participants were generally aware of the challenges of data sharing across healthcare 
providers. For example, they noted that hospitals could not easily share with one another and that 
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moving across jurisdictions often meant losing access to their health records. They also were aware of 
cases when very sensitive health information had been inadvertently exposed. 
 
Individuals saw value in using a blockchain-based solution as a means to support privacy-preserving 
data sharing. However, some individuals expressed reluctance to use such a platform until it has been 
thoroughly tested and more widely adopted. Areas of ongoing concern included who they would be 
sharing with and for what purpose. Generally, participants expressed willingness to consent to having 
university researchers use their data, or to share it with government agencies in the event of a public 
health crisis  but were reluctant to share with pharmaceutical companies or insurers for fear of being 
discriminated against.  This highlights the importance of designing upfront information about the type of 
organization requesting access and a clear explanation of their reason for wanting to use individuals’ 
health data.    Individuals also wanted assurances that researchers or other users of their data would not 
be able to reuse data for another purpose without their consent or assemble data about them from 
disparate sources to create a health profile about them (a “mosaic effect” [Wittes, 2011]). Participants 
were not universally hesitant to engage with a more experimental platform; as one focus group 
participant put it: “. . . someone has to start, right? There would be falls and all that and there would be 
corrections, I’m willing to be on the beta.” 
 
One cognitive constraint leading to possible lack of trust was in connection with the way that the 
cryptographic proofs operated. Focus group participants expressed a lack of understanding and need for 
more transparency about the manner in which cryptography protected privacy and validated claims, with 
one participant referring to the proofs as a “black box”.  This suggests a need for informational tools and 
techniques, such as decision aids that could support participants’ choices to engage with the platform. 
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(Williams et. al, 2014) or algorithmic transparency.  Unlike in artificial intelligence (AI) solutions where 
solution designers have often resisted requests to reveal their algorithms in order to protect their interests 
(Diakopolous, 2016), there is a longstanding practice of algorithmic transparency in cryptography. 
Kerchoff’s Principle, one of the guiding axioms of cybersecurity solution design, specifies that a 
cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the private key, is public 
knowledge (Stewart, Tittel & Chapple, 2008).  Thus, cybersecurity solution designers have much 
stronger incentives for revealing their cryptographic algorithms than do AI researchers, suggesting that 
this cognitive barrier can be overcome.  
 
Focus group participants generally liked the idea of having greater control and custody of their personal 
data, though one participant did express concern: “My first impression was ‘crap, now I have to keep 
track of it all’.” Another participant said they would share the power of control and consent with 
immediate family members in case anything happened to them. Universally, participants did not want to 
bear the risk, typical of current blockchain solutions, of losing access to their data if they lost their 
private cryptographic key.  They were all willing to give up some self-sovereignty for the ability to have 
a way to regain access. 
 
In terms of usability of a decentralized cryptosystem, individuals expressed a number of concerns. In 
particular, some participants identified the risk of exclusion of non-tech savvy and older users. However, 
another participant in an older age demographic noted: “. . .actually today older people have more access 
to smartphones then they have had in the last 5 or 10 years.” Another noted, “I think it will come to a 
stage that it will be much easier to use for older people.” Participants also expressed concern about the 
understandability of consent terms and conditions, pointing to the fact that these statements can be very 
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complex and difficult to interpret, which is consistent with the findings of previous studies.  They 
requested that terms and conditions be presented in understandable language upfront in the handshake 
process, not at step five as in the technical prototype they were shown.   
 
In relation to the offering of a reward, most individuals felt comfortable with this idea but did express 
some concern about potential effects in relation to the scale and granularity of data being shared and the 
use to which the data would be put. For example, one study participant wondered: “would that become a 
barrier for researchers who didn’t have that kind of [money], that a company has to compensate people, 
and how would that affect the landscape of information sharing?” Another said, “I would also worry that 
the outcomes would then be skewed because if you’re putting forth opportunities for compensation, then 
especially if you’re talking $50 or less, who are you attracting? Are you really attracting a broad enough 
range of people that have data that’s applicable to whatever the study is, so I don’t like that idea.” As a 
result, participants generally expressed a preference for smaller rewards functioning more as honoraria 
rather than market-based compensation. Others wanted to know more about the form a reward would 
take. For example, if provided in the form of a gift card, participants wondered if, they could be traced 
back to the research study.  As a result, some participants expressed a preference for the reward in the 
form of cryptocurrency, like Bitcoin, or even food. Overall, users noted that they have higher levels of 
trust in the process knowing that a research ethics board has reviewed the study design, including the 
issue of compensation, even if that meant the platform was not fully decentralized. 
 
Conclusion 
No one solution can solve the challenges of protecting participant’s privacy – of respecting their 
autonomy and dignity – in complex, revealing areas such as omic science. However, blockchain 
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technology could solve a number of the technical and social limitations of our current systems for 
onboarding participants and collecting, storing, and disseminating data. As Dove, Ozdemir, and Joly 
(2012, 439) remind us, “open innovation models, such as open access, open source, expert sourcing, and 
patent pools” are one of the primary means of “overcoming the ‘transfer problem’ in omics research that 
continues to hinder the full realization of concrete applications for human health” (2012, 439). One of 
the major hindrances to the full embrace of open innovation in omic science is the very real danger to 
patient privacy breach should their data be subject to unauthorized access or disclosure. Blockchain 
technology could let us have our omic cake and eat it too, by permitting the data to be studied while 
remaining private. Nevertheless, the above evaluation flags a number of ongoing areas of concern and 
future research challenges.  
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